[Update: I finished my final comments at 1:30 am Toronto time on May 4, so I've updated the article below with links to the newer PDF; the changes were relatively minor since the earlier draft, with just some tweaks on the TMCH comments, and stylistic changes, typos, etc.]
To help those who wish to submit public comments, or who wish to refine their own, I'm posting a draft the final version of my extensive comments here. My answers are all in RED text. I'm unable to use the broken online forms, so I'll need to submit via a DOCX file by tomorrow instead.
Despite my misgivings about the sham that is the comment period for the Phase 1 Initial Report of the Review of All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs Policy Development Process which I've written about in the past 4 blog posts, I attempted to continue to submit my comments today, which I had already started over the weekend (already more than 20 hours invested, to get to about 25% through the various questions, including background research and reading the report, etc.). However, the comment system is entirely broken.
ICANN actively mistreats stakeholders who don't understand English when it comes to policy development. While ICANN pretends to consider the global public interest, that cannot happen when non-English fluent participants are treated unfairly as second-class citizens. This is evident in the Phase 1 Initial Report of the Review of All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs Policy Development Process which is now open for public comment, as I've been writing about it for the past week (see my prior blog posts here and here).
People are beginning to realize there is something terribly wrong with the URS policy, as discussed in part 1 and part 2 of my recent series of articles titled "URS: A Failed Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy That ICANN Insiders Wish To Impose On More Registrants".
Here are 3 example URS determinations that seem very troubling from the public information available.
Rather than allow debate and analysis to continue, however, Kathy Kleiman, writing "as co-chair" (rather than in a personal capacity) wrote that:
At a certain point, you have to draw a line a line (sic) and move on.
However, this is completely opposite to how the URS Individual Proposals have been treated by the co-chairs of the working group. Rather than "drawing a line" and "moving on" after decisions were made in 2018 for inclusion of all individual proposals, they relitigated that entire issue. They even violated the rules while doing so.
This demonstrates the "double standard", that the co-chairs can go back and redo things when it suits their desires, but others are told they have to "move on" when trying to bring up legitimate topics.
The need to remove the co-chairs and replace them with an independent and neutral facilitator has never been greater.
In this multi-part series, I look at the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) policy, a domain name dispute resolution policy that the RPM PDP working group of ICANN is currently reviewing. In part 1, I gave an overview of the URS, and looked at 6 recent domain dispute decisions to help illustrate why it's such a failed policy, one that belongs in the trash heap of history.
I will go through the individual proposals in the same order that the working group is doing, in order to illuminate the issues involved. As there are more than 30 of them, I will cover just 7 of them in this post.
In this multi-part series, I look at the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) policy, a domain name dispute resolution policy that the RPM PDP working group of ICANN is currently reviewing. In a fair and unbiased review of the facts, the URS would be abandoned as a failed idea. However, in the ICANN world, that fair and unbiased review doesn't exist, and instead ICANN insiders wish to impose that flawed policy upon even more domain name registrants.
However, this important work is being undermined by working group chairs (Philip S. Corwin of Verisign, Brian Beckham, and Kathy Kleiman) who blatantly violate the working group rules.
In a prior blog post, I documented how Mr. Corwin wished to relitigate an already decided issue regarding the publication in the upcoming working group report of various URS-related proposals. The inappropriateness of this attempt to relitigate already decided issues is reinforced by the recent slides of the Pre-ICANN66 GNSO Policy Webinar of October 17, 2019, which clearly state, in relation to the RPM PDP:
The co-chairs don't enforce these rules, but instead disregard them to attempt to manipulate the outcome of the PDP by relitigating issues where they wish to change the past outcome with which they disagree.
However, despite having no new facts or information to justify reopening a decided issue (as per requirements of section 3.3 of the Working Group Guidelines)
WG members should be mindful that, once input/comment periods have been closed, discussions or decisions should not be resurrected unless there is group consensus that the issue should be revisited in light of new information that has been introduced. (page 7)
the co-chairs went further and decided to blatantly violate the ICANN transparency requirements, by initiating an anonymous survey of working group members to "take the temperature of the room." Section 4.1 of the Working Group Guidelines is unambiguous:
There is a presumption of full transparency in all WGs. (page 11, emphasis added)
An anonymous survey is a clear violation of that "full transparency" standard. Mr. Corwin must certainly be aware of this, given that the exact same transparency issue arose in the IGO PDP, where I initiated a Section 3.7 appeal to challenge a similar anonymous survey/poll, where ultimately we returned to a transparent process after my challenge. In the RPM PDP, though, where I'm unfairly banished from participating, current members appear to be unaware of the ICANN transparency requirements, or are too scared to challenge the co-chairs given how I was mistreated.
The results of that anonymous survey (if they are to be even trusted, which is a big "if", given the numerous problems we encountered in the IGO PDP with faulty numbers in surveys) will apparently be used to attempt to summarily remove sound proposals that are deemed "unpopular", while retaining deeply flawed proposals that are deemed "popular." I will examine in detail the good, the bad, and the ugly of those individual proposals in future blog posts.
However, consider that a mere 27 members of the PDP responded to the survey. This is out of a total membership of 166 participants in the working group (at the time of this post). This PDP has been beset with major deficiencies in its statistical work, as many members appear to be clueless when it comes to mathematics or statistics. In the best case scenario, had those 27 members surveyed been a random representative sample of the 166 members, the margin of error calculator at SurveyMonkey tells us that (with a population size of 166, confidence level of 95%, sample size of 27), the margin of error for the responses to each question is a whopping +/- 17%.
But, we know that this is not a random sample, so the true margin of error will be much higher than +/- 17%, and will not be centered around zero. It's a self-selected unrepresentative sample that turns out to be dominated by the Intellectual Property Constituency (IPC) members (at least 41%, which probably understates things, given a Dispute Resolution Provider also answered the survey, whose interests tend to be aligned with the IPC. Some of the folks claiming to be from the BC or CSG might also be closely aligned with the IPC, given the cobweb of interrelationships between various participants of the PDP. Full transparency (as required by the Working Group Guidelines) would reveal the positions of each member who participated, and allow one to properly audit the results.
Regardless, this group is entirely unrepresentative of the broader community (in particular, registrants like myself who are directly and greatly impacted by the policies are vastly underrepresented), which is exactly why one should be soliciting public comments on all proposals, rather than allowing a dominant group of insiders to advance their poorly thought out but "popular" (within the unrepresentative group) proposals and shut out sound but "unpopular" (within the unrepresentative group) proposals.
[To understand the systemic misuse of statistics in this PDP, see, for example (1) my post within the working group which documented problems with the Analysis Group survey, (2) further post which documented issues with an unrepresentative sample of 14 URS practitioners, where all but 1 focused on representing complainants (and which was far too small a sample to have any statistical validity), and (3) critiques of INTA study (here and here and resulting threads).]
Indeed, section 3.2 of the Working Group Guidelines requires that the co-chairs ensure representativeness:
Ideally, a Working Group should mirror the diversity and representativeness of the community by having representatives from most, if not all, CO Stakeholder Groups and/or Constituencies. It should be noted that certain issues might be more of interest to one part of the community than others. The Chair, in cooperation with the Secretariat and ICANN Staff, is continually expected to assess whether the WG has sufficiently broad representation, and if not, which groups should be approached to encourage participation. Similarly, if the Chair is of the opinion that there is over-representation to the point of capture, he/she should inform the Chartering Organization.
The Working Group and its subteams have long been captured by the dominant IPC, and the co-chairs ignore their responsibility to guard against capture.
Lastly, consider that Mr. Corwin has posited that too many proposals represent a high "burden" on the community. However, on October 31, 2019, after completing a review of all those URS proposals, he demonstrated the falsehood of the "burden" argument, stating:
I went through all the proposals and it doesn’t take very long to fill out.
If it didn't take him very long to analyze things, it shouldn't take the community long to do the same and provide feedback.
In conclusion, it's time for the manipulation of the RPM PDP by the co-chairs to end. I renew my call for them to be removed, so they can be replaced by a completely independent and neutral facilitator.