Paul Keating Was Right: IGOs Have Undermined The Legitimacy Of The ICANN Model

As I noted in a blog post yesterday, ICANN’s GNSO Council is scheduled to vote next week on the final report of the new IGO working group. Their one-sided recommendations, especially the removal of the “mutual jurisdiction clause” for IGOs, would substantially prejudice the rights of domain name owners to due process in the courts.

In a letter to ICANN in 2018, prominent attorney Paul Keating, who was a member of the original IGO working group that invested 4 years on the topic and which came to very different recommendations (that actually balanced the rights of registrants and IGO), told ICANN that:

To claim that the group was captured is simply nonsense.

He also noted that:

The Mathias letter makes clear that the objective of the IGOs is to discredit the many years work of the Working Group and to undermine the bottom up policy-development process that is fundamental to the legitimacy of the ICANN model. As a diligent and fair-minded member of the Working Group who actually invested the time to examine the issues in incredible detail and reach sound recommendations, I simply cannot accept his attempt to circumvent the Policy Development Process.

Unfortunately, Paul Keating was right: IGOs have undermined the legitimacy of the ICANN model, by relitigating the issue excessively, and ignoring public input until they succumbed to the IGOs demand for removal of the “mutual jurisdiction” clause. As I’ve noted repeatedly, IGOs have been after this unreasonable policy change for two decades!

Why did this happen? One reason is that the new IGO Working Group prevented me and others from participating, and instead was overwhelmingly dominated by those who have no interest in protecting registrants’ rights. This unbalanced representation led to this extremist outcome. I documented the unbalanced participation in an innovative review of the actual number of words spoken during calls, and posted on the mailing list, with the help of Kevin Ohashi. Those charts and the analysis were submitted to the working group via the public comment period (see pp. 27-30 here). This concern was also raised by the Registrar Stakeholder Group, who stated:

Second, the RrSG notes that the EPDP does not appear to contain any representatives from the RrSG, the Registry Stakeholder Group (RySG), and the Not-for-Profit Operational Concerns Constituency (NPOC), and some of the recommendations appear to have significant impact on those constituencies or domain name registrants. The absence of certain constituencies in the EPDP should not be rationale for drafting recommendations that could impact those constituencies. The RrSG strongly recommends that for the Final Report, the EPDP must consider and incorporate the feedback from constituencies not represented on the EPDP.

Let’s take a look at the original IGO working group’s mailing list archives. The “consensus call” process took place in May 2018 and June 2018. There was vigorous and active participation by numerous members of the working group. May 2018 had 75 posts, and June 2018 had 127 posts, for example. Members were active and engaged in the working group. Phil Corwin of Verisign falsely claimed “captured”, as discussed yesterday, but look at the actual activity on the mailing list. Phil Corwin was a member of the registry constituency, but so were David Maher (of PIR) and Crystal Ondo (of Donuts, at the time). Both rejected Phil Corwin’s preferred option (arbitration), and were part of the group’s consensus (which the new working group is trying to relitigate). David Maher explained:

I support Option 1. I understand staff’s concern “that resolving a procedural question (immunity from jurisdiction) can automatically reverse a substantive panel finding, where the court has not had (and will not have) the opportunity to hear the case on its merits.” This problem will only arise if an IGO takes advantage of a UDRP or URS proceeding and then hides behind immunity. It appears from this group’s discussions that IGOs have had few or no problems in supporting their names and acronyms in court and administrative proceedings. For future proceedings, I believe it is justifiable to bar IGOs from invoking an intrinsically unfair legal maneuver.

Reg Levy of Tucows (representing herself, but obviously familiar with Registrar views) was also a participant, and was part of the consensus.

Similarly, Mike Rodenbaugh, former counsel at Yahoo! and a member of the Intellectual Property Constituency, was part of the consensus (and opposed to the arbitration proposal that Phil Corwin desired). I created an unofficial spreadsheet which summarized the input. You can see that it closely aligns with the results by ICANN Staff which were produced later, and the final report (pp. 4-6, and pp. 18-22 which showed the designations of the alternative options which were rejected).

Contrast the original working group with the sham nature of the new IGO working group. Their mailing list archives can be found here, and their phony “consensus call” took place in March 2022. As was noted by the Registrars Stakeholder Group above, there were no representatives from the registrars or registries who even participated in this working group! Contrast that with the original working group (which was open to anyone), which had wide and engaged membership. Their phony “consensus call” amounted to a single email from the chair (Chris Disspain, who dominated the discussions throughout the working group, as noted previously) claiming “full consensus”. Take a look at the mailing list — was there widespread actual public support for that designation? Of course not — they simply manipulate the working group’s processes, to consider “silence” as being “acceptance.”

Contrast this silence with the vigorous debate in the original working group, where members had to affirmatively post their positions, and many did so with their reasoning. This new working group with already unbalanced and limited participation didn’t even bother to do so, as they knew that their unengaged members couldn’t actually justify their positions. They simply “went along with whatever the chair decided”, and sat in silence. The original working group was a model for how all sides had an opportunity to participate, and all views were considered.

The new working group’s final recommendations are an insult to the intelligence of the ICANN community and to those who took the time to respond. Rather than considering the serious deleterious impact of their proposals on registrants’ rights to have the merits of their dispute decided by the courts, the new working group instead decided to double-down on their intellectual dishonesty.

On page 9, they assert that:

The inclusion of an arbitration option in the UDRP and URS does not replace, limit, or otherwise affect the availability of court proceedings to either party, or, in respect of the URS, the ability to file an appeal within the URS framework. Either party continues to have the right to file proceedings in a court, up to the point in time when an arbitration proceeding is commenced (if any).

The working group seeks to pull a fast one on the public, by making this assertion, which did not alter the actual recommendation (which eliminated the mutual jurisdiction clause for IGOs). I called this out explicitly on pages 40-41 of my own comments. I quoted their own words! For example, Jay Chapman said:

So really what the problem is as I see it, the current proposal as written today, it doesn’t provide for due process. It’s a forced process. And at best, it seems to me to be somewhat intellectually dishonest. And I think everyone kind of knows it on the call.

With the mutual jurisdiction requirement also currently sought to be disposed of, it seems to be kind of a wink-wink on the registrant being able to find relief or at least a decision on the merits I suppose by going to court. It’s kind of like the group wants to say, well, good luck with that, Mrs./Mr. Business Registrant. There won’t be any jurisdiction in the court and thus no remedy for you.

Without giving every example (I encourage folks to read my full comment submission), Paul McGrady noted:

Thanks, Chris. It was just the nerdy thing that I put into the chat that a waiver of the right to go to court, those rights that are being given up could really never fully be captured in an arbitration mechanism because the rights in Poland are different than the rights in South Africa, which are different than the rights in the U.S. or whatever. So what we would be doing is creating some sort of amalgam of protections for registrants in the arbitration process that we, I guess, think best blend all the various rights around the world. Then we would be offering that to registrants in lieu of their local protections. And as I said before, I think in the chat, the optics of that, they’re hard to get your arms around that. We don’t want ICANN be accused of overreach, for what it’s worth. Thanks.

Instead, the new working group buries the truth in a word salad of obfuscatory text.

The truth is this — the new working group was chartered to look at a very specific and limited scenario, namely:

      1. An IGO wins a UDRP.
      2. The domain name registrant decides to challenge the UDRP outcome, by going to court, as per the mutual jurisdiction clause.
      3. Instead of deciding the case on the merits, the court decides that it cannot proceed due to the claimed immunity of the IGO.

As explained in my comments, which reviewed the entire history of the UDRP, this scenario has never actually happened. The “expected outcome” was that a court should find that the “mutual jurisdiction” clause amounts to a waiver of immunity, and thus the court can proceed. To attach some numbers, I would argue that if left unchanged, the current policy would result in 95%+ of such court cases to find that the IGO has waived immunity, and the court can decide the dispute on the merits. Our work was focused on deciding what to do about the “other 5%” of cases, that would theoretically fall through the cracks, and the original working group came up with a solution to that problem (i.e. vitiate the UDRP, and put both sides in the same position as they would be had the UDRP not taken place, so that the case can then proceed in the courts, mirroring the actual legal rights of the IGOs and respondents had ICANN never created the UDRP policy in the first place; as I noted in my comments, a “Notice of Objection” system would be an even better solution, see page 15+).

But, what did the new IGO working group do instead? Rather than focus on their limited mandate, they went far beyond the scope of their charter to relitigate already decided issues. I documented this on pages 31-35 of my comments. By removing the “mutual jurisdiction” requirement for IGOs, the working group completely changes the likelihood of the scenario above. Instead of focusing on a rare scenario, and what to do about it, they actually transformed the rare scenario into the expected scenario! Without the mutual jurisdiction clause for IGOs, instead of say 95% of courts deciding the case on the merits (leaving 5% of such cases undecided on the merits), the reverse would happen! Courts would overwhelmingly find that domain owners could not proceed to a decision on the merits in a dispute with the IGOs, as there was no waiver of immunity. So, 95% of cases (instead of 5%) would (under the new working group’s proposed elimination of mutual jurisdiction) now be in a state where the court could not proceed to a decision on the merits — i.e. the cases would be thrown out on a technicality, rather than be decided on the merits.

Instead of recognizing this perversion of justice, the new working group attempts to obfuscate things by claiming that nothing prevents a domain owner from filing a case in court. This is a ridiculous and misguided statement — it’s obvious ICANN can’t control anyone’s right to take anyone to court, but what it can do (and will do, if these recommendations are adopted) is prejudice the actual outcome of what happens at that court! This working group turned an unlikely scenario into the most probable scenario, thereby harming registrants’ rights to have their disputes decided by the courts.

This is exactly like the scenario with UK and Australian registrants/registrars that ICANN created due to bad policymaking, whereby there’s no cause of action to challenge a UDRP. I warned about this in March 2022. By the logic of the new working group, there’s “no problem here”, because registrants can still file a court case (even though they will overwhelmingly have their case refused and not be decided on the merits!).

In conclusion, this new working group’s work must be rejected. It was the product of a group with unbalanced and unengaged representation (in contrast with the original working group that spent 4 years on the topic). Furthermore, their recommendations do not stand up to even the most basic scrutiny, as noted in the original comment submissions. Simply pretending that registrants can still go to court, when they’ve knowingly tilted the probabilities of what would take place at those courts, insults the intelligence of the community.

 

 

ICANN GNSO Council Was Misled Regarding Alleged Capture Of The Original IGO Working Group

Next week, the newly-created IGO Working Group’s Final Report is due to be voted upon by the ICANN GNSO Council, according to agenda item #5. As previously discussed, that working group’s report is an utter sham, and doesn’t reflect the public comments that were opposed to the recommendations.

It’s important to note that this isn’t the first working group that reviewed this issue. The prior working group (that I was a member of; the new working group would not permit me or others with similar views to join) came to very different conclusions. That report was attacked by Phil Corwin of Verisign, in a minority statement that falsely alleged “capture”. How do we know that this was a false claim? We need only look at Phil Corwin’s own statements in November 2017 (prior to the consensus call, when the results were not yet known as to the final recommendations), where he stated:

So far as the values of openness, transparency and inclusion, this working group has been completely open and inclusive. We have – we did extensive outreach to encourage participation by GAC members and IGO representatives. They chose not to become members. That’s not on us; that’s on them. Everything we’ve done is transparent. There’s transcripts, there’s documents.

So far as representativeness, if there is any attempt to besmirch the work of this working group when we issue our final report with allegations that have been captured by any particular group or did not represent enough the different components of the ICANN community, we’ve already – the cochairs have already reviewed that with staff. And while this is a small working group, there’s no requirement that every working group have dozens and dozens or even hundreds of members, but we have had sufficient participation from different parts of the ICANN community, I think, to refute any such allegations if they should arise. [pp.14-15 of transcript]

So, prior to the final results of the working group’s efforts being known, Phil Corwin was happy to defend the output of the working group. In fact, Phil Corwin expected that his preferred option (which involved arbitration) was a shoe-in to be adopted.

He even openly invited me to go on the record with my claims that he (as a co-chair) had abused his authority (in attempting to use an anonymous poll, in violation of ICANN’s transparency requirements), see:

Number one, and, you know, I don’t want to make a big deal out of this but George has stated several times in writing and now just orally that he believes the cochairs have abused their authority. I reject that categorically. The cochairs have been very careful to not cross any bright line in abusing their authority to be administrative and not push toward a particular sharing information about internal ICANN developments is not the same as pushing a particular policy goal. We had a full discussion and the vote could have gone the other way and then we – that wasn’t the will of the working group.

But if anyone who is a member of this working group feels that the chairs have abused their authority, please go ahead and – that they’ve been treated unfairly, go ahead and file a complaint with the ombudsman and have it investigated. But I reject any suggestion of that. [pp.11-12 of transcript]

Why should he be upset, then, when I did successfully file a Section 3.7 appeal, one that was entirely meritorious, as documented on the mailing list archives (see Dec 2017 and beyond)? After that successful appeal resulted in transparent processes to determine consensus, it turns out that Phil Corwin’s preferred outcome of arbitration was completely rejected, with consensus against, as noted in the final report (pp. 19-20, with Option #3 [arbitration] showing “Consensus Call Outcome: MINORITY VIEW (WITH CONSENSUS AGAINST THIS OPTION“).

So, there you have it. When the results of the working group didn’t go his way, like a hypocrite Phil Corwin changed his tune completely and attacked the working group at GNSO Council (a working group that he had great control over, given his role as co-chair). Phil Corwin ignored the fact that he himself openly claimed that working group was representative and shouldn’t be “besmirched” before the results of its processes were determined. He only claimed those processes were “captured” after they resulted in recommendations that differed from his preferred outcome.

GNSO Council was completely misled. On that basis alone, the foundation for creating the new working group was built on a lie.

Why is this important? This led to the creation of a new working group that doesn’t reflect the views of impacted parties (particularly registrants). Indeed, this new working group has ignored fundamental criticisms that were made in the public comments. For example, the Registrar Stakeholder Group’s comment noted that it “has serious concerns about a number of the recommendations in the Interim Report that are contrary to the EPDP’s charter, the position of the ICANN Board, and could prejudice the rights of domain name registrants.” (page 1)

My own detailed submission explained how this new working group’s recommendations are untenable, and the entire history of the issue (including the comments from 2019, which documented the first working group and how its efforts were sabotaged when its recommendations went before the ICANN Board). I encourage anyone who is open-minded to review those thorough submissions, and contrast them with the haphazard recommendations produced by this new sham working group.

In conclusion, the new working group’s final report must be rejected, if ICANN and the GNSO Council value integrity of their processes. In the event they accept this report, they will further delegitimize themselves, and openly declare that their processes are open to manipulation by insiders who wish to promulgate extremist policy views that have been rejected for two decades. “Backchannel sabotage” (see page 45) should not be rewarded.

 

Red Alert: Get your domain names out of the UK and Australia now!

If you are a domain name owner using a UK-based or Australian-based registrar, you should seriously consider moving your domains elsewhere, as you apparently have no legal rights to judicial review in their courts after an adverse UDRP or other domain dispute procedure. In other words, you are a second-class citizen if you’re exposed to registrars in those jurisdictions, compared to other jurisdictions in the world. I would strongly recommend that you move your domain names out, or at least get your own independent legal advice.

Continue reading “Red Alert: Get your domain names out of the UK and Australia now!”

I Solemnly Swear That I Am Up To No Good

ICANN has a public comment period that ends today for “Proposed Revisions to the ICANN Documentary Information Disclosure Policy.” Below is a PDF of my full submission, which begins as follows:


Dear ICANN org,

In the Harry Potter series of books and films, access to the Marauder’s Map was granted by saying the phrase “I solemnly swear that I am up to no good” after tapping the map. I imagine that the ICANN staff who crafted these proposed changes to the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy (DIDP) had that quote in mind, either explicitly or implicitly, when they sat down to edit the existing version of the DIDP.

[read the rest in the following PDF]

Submission of Leap of Faith Financial Services Inc. to ICANN Regarding Proposed Revisions to the ICANN Documentary Information Disclosure Policy

ICANN Incompetence On Full Display With the RPM PDP Phase 1 Final Report

ICANN holds themselves out as an organization that is highly competent, but that could not be further from the truth. More evidence of their utter incompetence can be seen in the ICANN RPM PDP Phase 1 final report, which has a deadline for public comments of May 21, 2021 (this coming Friday). [Originally the deadline was going to be April 30, 2021, but I demonstrated how that was unacceptable, and they changed it.] I scanned through the document quickly this afternoon, and was appalled that it is replete with glaring and obvious errors. ICANN staff, GNSO Council, and anyone associated with this report should be ashamed that their names are attached to it. Of course, I’m unfairly banished from all ICANN working groups, so I have no responsibility for their obvious errors.

Continue reading “ICANN Incompetence On Full Display With the RPM PDP Phase 1 Final Report”

ICANN Staff Have Repeatedly Violated Public Comment Period Requirements in Bylaws

I noticed earlier today that the ICANN public comment period for Phase 1 of the RPM PDP was unreasonably short, going from April 7, 2021 to April 30, 2021, a mere 23 days. As I noted on Twitter:

this didn’t make sense, and seemed to me to be an attempt to stifle public input. I submitted a complaint to the relevant ICANN staff, and even submitted a supporting spreadsheet analysis which proved that 23 days is inconsistent with past comment periods.

Continue reading “ICANN Staff Have Repeatedly Violated Public Comment Period Requirements in Bylaws”

Verisign Wants The URS To Apply To Dot-com Registrants

Verisign, the abusive monopolist that operates the registries for  dot-com and dot-net, wants to impose the Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) policy on dot-com and dot-net registrants, which will put valuable legacy domain names at risk via a flawed dispute resolution procedure that was designed only for low stakes “throwaway” and worthless new gTLD domains.

Continue reading “Verisign Wants The URS To Apply To Dot-com Registrants”

ICANN RPM PDP Phase 1 Comment Period is another sham, part 7

More shenanigans have now been detected in the ICANN RPM PDP, namely attempts to manipulate the outcome of the policy work through duplicative and/or coordinated comment submissions.

The ICANN RPM PDP Phase 1 comment period ended on May 4, 2020, more than 2 months ago, yet ICANN had repeatedly refused to allow the raw public comments to be downloaded for easy independent analysis. I discussed that in a prior blog post.

After much energy expended in a back and forth with ICANN’s Complaints department, some (but not all) of which has been posted under Complaint #00014905 on ICANN’s website, they finally did the right thing and made the raw comments downloadable yesterday (just go to the File menu, and select the Download submenu, choose a format, etc.). Making the public comments spreadsheet downloadable was something that literally took ICANN staff at most 5 minutes to do, yet they spent months refusing such access. That is a cultural problem at ICANN,  which refuses reasonable requests in the public interest, unless one is an “insider” — had it been Verisign or another “friend” of ICANN, surely they would have simply done the right thing immediately.

As I suspected in the prior blog post, there were seeming irregularities in the public comments:

There may be even more irregularities which would be easier to detect if the data was more easily accessible.

I have now created a new spreadsheet (available in Excel format here, if the link to the Google Sheet is not working, e.g. if you’re in China) that highlights specific comments that were submitted, allowing one to easily compare them and see how similar they are to one another. The “Form Responses 1” tab is the original raw data, in its hideous format which made comparisons and analysis quite difficult (couldn’t resize or move columns/rows,  long comments hard to read, couldn’t copy/paste, etc.). The “Analysis 1” tab takes row 1 and turns it into Column A using the “TRANSPOSE” function (see formula in cell A1). Similarly, the comments of Hermes, UNIFAB, Comite Colbert, Chanel, Moncler and Novartis are taken from rows 7, 25, 28, 30, 32 and 48, and turned into columns B through F, again, using the “TRANSPOSE” function (see formulae in cells B1 through G1). Thus, the cells weren’t copied and pasted — they were pulled using a formula, and thus no duplication errors were introduced by incorrect copying of cells to the wrong place. I then made a few cells bold, added a background colour for column A, and resized the columns B through F, to make it easier to see the similarities.

As you can easily see by simply scrolling down through all the rows (helps to have a large monitor, to see all 6 comments side-by-side without scrolling), these were not 6 independently-generated comments. Instead, they are essentially 1 submission that has been, for the most part duplicated (with minor variations in a few places) 6 times. Remember, the original spreadsheet did not allow downloads or copying and pasting of answers. This implies that those 6 companies likely coordinated their submissions via a separate (and presumably private) master document that they shared amongst each other, which was used to copy/paste submissions. This then allowed them to over-represent their comments, relative to other submissions, in an attempt to manipulate the outcome of this PDP by making their preferred outcomes seem more popular, while simultaneously diminishing the impact of opposing positions.

The “Analysis 2” tab  highlights the comments of Renee Fossen of Forum (National Arbitration Forum) and Richard Hill. As I noted previously, many of Mr. Hill’s comments simply supported Ms. Fossen’s.

Going back to the the Analysis 1 tab, this is not the only time some of those  companies have submitted mostly duplicative coordinated comments to ICANN. Their comments to the WHOIS EPDP comment period can be seen via the spreadsheet here. While not downloadable, one can simply compare submissions in rows 9, 11,  12, 13 and 14 with each other and note the striking similarities.

The goal of these public comment periods is to get a sense of how the community feels about the various proposals. As such, it is important that those submissions be representative. When there is a small number of unrepresentative submissions, policy outcomes can be skewed by those over-represented participants or voices, like those 6 European brand owners.

Why does this matter? In the RPM PDP comment period, there were only 55 submissions that were counted (some of the obvious duplications were already eliminated, e.g. the multiple submissions from Hermes and the IPC that I had previously discussed). If one eliminates 5 or 6 of the above comments as duplicative (let’s say 5, to be conservative), that reduces the total number to 50. That might not seem like a big difference, but it’s enormous, given that the superficial analysis performed by the working group members (remember, I’m unfairly banned, and am unable to participate, but have reviewed all the recordings) focused on just the “numbers” as to how many “votes” a proposal got from the community. Removing 10% or more of “votes” from specific proposals would shift the balance considerably, on nearly every issue.

Let’s look at a specific example, URS Individual Proposal #15, a deeply flawed proposal that I’ve discussed in the past and which you can see my own comments in cell C19 of the “Public Comment Review Tool” (in the URS Proposal15 tab). The public comments were reviewed on June 25, 2020, and one can read the transcript of that working group call (starting from page 7). Without adjusting the responses, 45.5% of respondents, i.e. 25 out of 55, did not support the proposal. That level of opposition alone should have been enough to kill the proposal outright. But, on the other side, UNIFAB, Colbert, Chanel, Moncler and Novartis all supported it with a “minor” change and Hermes supported it “as written”. “Support as written” and “support concept with minor change” had a combined 15 out of 55 responses (27%).

But, adjusting the responses to eliminate the over-representation of those European brand owners has 2 effects. First, the opposition becomes 25 out of 50 (i.e. the denominator changes from 55 to 50), and so that becomes 50% (instead of 45.5%). And, for those supporting it, it goes from 15 out of 55 to just 10 out of 50 (i.e. affects both the numerator and the denominator), and thus that becomes only 20% support.

Shockingly, and a sign of the true level of capture of the working group, that proposal continues to live to fight another day (see page 25 of the transcript), rather than being tossed in the scrap heap.

Phil offered us an opportunity to live another day, to take the concept back, to rework it and reintroduce it to the working group. So I think that those of us who wanted the concept to survive should declare victory, retreat, and work on this together and then try again with introducing something to the working group that might be more acceptable to the working group at-large.

Truly disgusting, and I’ll have more to say about the repeated double-standards evident throughout the superficial “review” of the public comments in future blog posts.

Similar swings in relative support levels would happen on other proposals and recommendations, once the proper adjustments are made.

It’s clear that the working group must now go back and redo the analysis of the past 2 months, to remove the effects of those attempting to manipulate the apparent popularity of their positions. That’s for starters. The blame for this falls squarely on ICANN staff and the co-chairs, for (1) not providing a downloadable version of the comments 2 months ago, when multiple people asked for it, (2) designing a purposely-flawed comment period that created enormous burdens for those wishing to make comments, and (3) not doing widespread outreach to get a large representative sample of the views of affected stakeholders.

You’ll recall that ICANN dismissed and denigrated the thousands of comments that were submitted in the dot-org and dot-com contract comment periods. They were dismissed as spam, for example.  Verisign themselves stated:

The Internet Commerce Association (“ICA”) and other allies in the domain name speculation business including registrars like Namecheap and Dynadot, have made a concerted effort to distort this public comment period. They have distorted the facts in a campaign-style effort to flood ICANN with public comments created by form-letter generators and templates created for the sole purpose of protecting their own financial stake in the speculation business.

Verisign went on to write about attempts to “hijack the legitimate public comment period”. Those are strong words. If Verisign is to be consistent, then the distortion caused by those European brand owners, the attempt to “hijack the legitimate comment period” must be addressed.

This failure caused by ICANN staff and the co-chairs can also be addressed by having a second public comment period. This should be by the traditional email interface, rather than the flawed Google Forms that has been repeatedly and roundly criticized by multiple stakeholders.

In conclusion, this new evidence reinforces the conclusion that the RPM PDP is a captured and sham working group, that needs a complete overhaul, if it’s even worth salvaging in any form. Their work product, upon any serious examination, has been complete garbage. While some may “hold their nose” and live with it, the stakes are too high for the public (and domain name registrants in particular) to allow this fiasco to continue.

 

 

 

Original Cooperative Agreement That Laid The Foundation of Verisign’s Monopoly

To understand Verisign’s anti-competitive monopoly for dot-com domain name registration services, it is important to analyze its agreements with the US government. NTIA has a page on their website documenting aspects of their cooperative agreement with Verisign. However, that page is incomplete, as it only lists Amendments 10 through 35.  The original agreement (between the National Science Foundation and Network Solutions) and the first 9 amendments are not published.

A Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was made to NTIA to obtain those additional historical records. I’m happy to report that NTIA responded to that request and sent all the requested documents. [NB: the US government takes FOIA requests seriously, unlike ICANN’s broken Documentary Information Disclosure Policy, which pretends to be like the FOIA but is far inferior to it]

Continue reading “Original Cooperative Agreement That Laid The Foundation of Verisign’s Monopoly”

ICANN RPM PDP Phase 1 Comment Period is another sham, part 6

More and more people are coming to the realization that the ICANN comment periods are a sham, open to manipulation by ICANN insiders and staff. The comment period for the Phase 1 Initial Report of the Review of All Rights Protection Mechanisms in All gTLDs Policy Development Process ended on May 4, 2020, eleven days ago. I have previously written about it (see my prior blog posts hereherehere, here and here). Rather than diving in and actually doing the work of analyzing the public comments, ICANN staff are actively preventing working group members from having easy access to those submissions.

Continue reading “ICANN RPM PDP Phase 1 Comment Period is another sham, part 6”