Paul Keating Was Right: IGOs Have Undermined The Legitimacy Of The ICANN Model

As I noted in a blog post yesterday, ICANN’s GNSO Council is scheduled to vote next week on the final report of the new IGO working group. Their one-sided recommendations, especially the removal of the “mutual jurisdiction clause” for IGOs, would substantially prejudice the rights of domain name owners to due process in the courts.

In a letter to ICANN in 2018, prominent attorney Paul Keating, who was a member of the original IGO working group that invested 4 years on the topic and which came to very different recommendations (that actually balanced the rights of registrants and IGO), told ICANN that:

To claim that the group was captured is simply nonsense.

He also noted that:

The Mathias letter makes clear that the objective of the IGOs is to discredit the many years work of the Working Group and to undermine the bottom up policy-development process that is fundamental to the legitimacy of the ICANN model. As a diligent and fair-minded member of the Working Group who actually invested the time to examine the issues in incredible detail and reach sound recommendations, I simply cannot accept his attempt to circumvent the Policy Development Process.

Unfortunately, Paul Keating was right: IGOs have undermined the legitimacy of the ICANN model, by relitigating the issue excessively, and ignoring public input until they succumbed to the IGOs demand for removal of the “mutual jurisdiction” clause. As I’ve noted repeatedly, IGOs have been after this unreasonable policy change for two decades!

Why did this happen? One reason is that the new IGO Working Group prevented me and others from participating, and instead was overwhelmingly dominated by those who have no interest in protecting registrants’ rights. This unbalanced representation led to this extremist outcome. I documented the unbalanced participation in an innovative review of the actual number of words spoken during calls, and posted on the mailing list, with the help of Kevin Ohashi. Those charts and the analysis were submitted to the working group via the public comment period (see pp. 27-30 here). This concern was also raised by the Registrar Stakeholder Group, who stated:

Second, the RrSG notes that the EPDP does not appear to contain any representatives from the RrSG, the Registry Stakeholder Group (RySG), and the Not-for-Profit Operational Concerns Constituency (NPOC), and some of the recommendations appear to have significant impact on those constituencies or domain name registrants. The absence of certain constituencies in the EPDP should not be rationale for drafting recommendations that could impact those constituencies. The RrSG strongly recommends that for the Final Report, the EPDP must consider and incorporate the feedback from constituencies not represented on the EPDP.

Let’s take a look at the original IGO working group’s mailing list archives. The “consensus call” process took place in May 2018 and June 2018. There was vigorous and active participation by numerous members of the working group. May 2018 had 75 posts, and June 2018 had 127 posts, for example. Members were active and engaged in the working group. Phil Corwin of Verisign falsely claimed “captured”, as discussed yesterday, but look at the actual activity on the mailing list. Phil Corwin was a member of the registry constituency, but so were David Maher (of PIR) and Crystal Ondo (of Donuts, at the time). Both rejected Phil Corwin’s preferred option (arbitration), and were part of the group’s consensus (which the new working group is trying to relitigate). David Maher explained:

I support Option 1. I understand staff’s concern “that resolving a procedural question (immunity from jurisdiction) can automatically reverse a substantive panel finding, where the court has not had (and will not have) the opportunity to hear the case on its merits.” This problem will only arise if an IGO takes advantage of a UDRP or URS proceeding and then hides behind immunity. It appears from this group’s discussions that IGOs have had few or no problems in supporting their names and acronyms in court and administrative proceedings. For future proceedings, I believe it is justifiable to bar IGOs from invoking an intrinsically unfair legal maneuver.

Reg Levy of Tucows (representing herself, but obviously familiar with Registrar views) was also a participant, and was part of the consensus.

Similarly, Mike Rodenbaugh, former counsel at Yahoo! and a member of the Intellectual Property Constituency, was part of the consensus (and opposed to the arbitration proposal that Phil Corwin desired). I created an unofficial spreadsheet which summarized the input. You can see that it closely aligns with the results by ICANN Staff which were produced later, and the final report (pp. 4-6, and pp. 18-22 which showed the designations of the alternative options which were rejected).

Contrast the original working group with the sham nature of the new IGO working group. Their mailing list archives can be found here, and their phony “consensus call” took place in March 2022. As was noted by the Registrars Stakeholder Group above, there were no representatives from the registrars or registries who even participated in this working group! Contrast that with the original working group (which was open to anyone), which had wide and engaged membership. Their phony “consensus call” amounted to a single email from the chair (Chris Disspain, who dominated the discussions throughout the working group, as noted previously) claiming “full consensus”. Take a look at the mailing list — was there widespread actual public support for that designation? Of course not — they simply manipulate the working group’s processes, to consider “silence” as being “acceptance.”

Contrast this silence with the vigorous debate in the original working group, where members had to affirmatively post their positions, and many did so with their reasoning. This new working group with already unbalanced and limited participation didn’t even bother to do so, as they knew that their unengaged members couldn’t actually justify their positions. They simply “went along with whatever the chair decided”, and sat in silence. The original working group was a model for how all sides had an opportunity to participate, and all views were considered.

The new working group’s final recommendations are an insult to the intelligence of the ICANN community and to those who took the time to respond. Rather than considering the serious deleterious impact of their proposals on registrants’ rights to have the merits of their dispute decided by the courts, the new working group instead decided to double-down on their intellectual dishonesty.

On page 9, they assert that:

The inclusion of an arbitration option in the UDRP and URS does not replace, limit, or otherwise affect the availability of court proceedings to either party, or, in respect of the URS, the ability to file an appeal within the URS framework. Either party continues to have the right to file proceedings in a court, up to the point in time when an arbitration proceeding is commenced (if any).

The working group seeks to pull a fast one on the public, by making this assertion, which did not alter the actual recommendation (which eliminated the mutual jurisdiction clause for IGOs). I called this out explicitly on pages 40-41 of my own comments. I quoted their own words! For example, Jay Chapman said:

So really what the problem is as I see it, the current proposal as written today, it doesn’t provide for due process. It’s a forced process. And at best, it seems to me to be somewhat intellectually dishonest. And I think everyone kind of knows it on the call.

With the mutual jurisdiction requirement also currently sought to be disposed of, it seems to be kind of a wink-wink on the registrant being able to find relief or at least a decision on the merits I suppose by going to court. It’s kind of like the group wants to say, well, good luck with that, Mrs./Mr. Business Registrant. There won’t be any jurisdiction in the court and thus no remedy for you.

Without giving every example (I encourage folks to read my full comment submission), Paul McGrady noted:

Thanks, Chris. It was just the nerdy thing that I put into the chat that a waiver of the right to go to court, those rights that are being given up could really never fully be captured in an arbitration mechanism because the rights in Poland are different than the rights in South Africa, which are different than the rights in the U.S. or whatever. So what we would be doing is creating some sort of amalgam of protections for registrants in the arbitration process that we, I guess, think best blend all the various rights around the world. Then we would be offering that to registrants in lieu of their local protections. And as I said before, I think in the chat, the optics of that, they’re hard to get your arms around that. We don’t want ICANN be accused of overreach, for what it’s worth. Thanks.

Instead, the new working group buries the truth in a word salad of obfuscatory text.

The truth is this — the new working group was chartered to look at a very specific and limited scenario, namely:

      1. An IGO wins a UDRP.
      2. The domain name registrant decides to challenge the UDRP outcome, by going to court, as per the mutual jurisdiction clause.
      3. Instead of deciding the case on the merits, the court decides that it cannot proceed due to the claimed immunity of the IGO.

As explained in my comments, which reviewed the entire history of the UDRP, this scenario has never actually happened. The “expected outcome” was that a court should find that the “mutual jurisdiction” clause amounts to a waiver of immunity, and thus the court can proceed. To attach some numbers, I would argue that if left unchanged, the current policy would result in 95%+ of such court cases to find that the IGO has waived immunity, and the court can decide the dispute on the merits. Our work was focused on deciding what to do about the “other 5%” of cases, that would theoretically fall through the cracks, and the original working group came up with a solution to that problem (i.e. vitiate the UDRP, and put both sides in the same position as they would be had the UDRP not taken place, so that the case can then proceed in the courts, mirroring the actual legal rights of the IGOs and respondents had ICANN never created the UDRP policy in the first place; as I noted in my comments, a “Notice of Objection” system would be an even better solution, see page 15+).

But, what did the new IGO working group do instead? Rather than focus on their limited mandate, they went far beyond the scope of their charter to relitigate already decided issues. I documented this on pages 31-35 of my comments. By removing the “mutual jurisdiction” requirement for IGOs, the working group completely changes the likelihood of the scenario above. Instead of focusing on a rare scenario, and what to do about it, they actually transformed the rare scenario into the expected scenario! Without the mutual jurisdiction clause for IGOs, instead of say 95% of courts deciding the case on the merits (leaving 5% of such cases undecided on the merits), the reverse would happen! Courts would overwhelmingly find that domain owners could not proceed to a decision on the merits in a dispute with the IGOs, as there was no waiver of immunity. So, 95% of cases (instead of 5%) would (under the new working group’s proposed elimination of mutual jurisdiction) now be in a state where the court could not proceed to a decision on the merits — i.e. the cases would be thrown out on a technicality, rather than be decided on the merits.

Instead of recognizing this perversion of justice, the new working group attempts to obfuscate things by claiming that nothing prevents a domain owner from filing a case in court. This is a ridiculous and misguided statement — it’s obvious ICANN can’t control anyone’s right to take anyone to court, but what it can do (and will do, if these recommendations are adopted) is prejudice the actual outcome of what happens at that court! This working group turned an unlikely scenario into the most probable scenario, thereby harming registrants’ rights to have their disputes decided by the courts.

This is exactly like the scenario with UK and Australian registrants/registrars that ICANN created due to bad policymaking, whereby there’s no cause of action to challenge a UDRP. I warned about this in March 2022. By the logic of the new working group, there’s “no problem here”, because registrants can still file a court case (even though they will overwhelmingly have their case refused and not be decided on the merits!).

In conclusion, this new working group’s work must be rejected. It was the product of a group with unbalanced and unengaged representation (in contrast with the original working group that spent 4 years on the topic). Furthermore, their recommendations do not stand up to even the most basic scrutiny, as noted in the original comment submissions. Simply pretending that registrants can still go to court, when they’ve knowingly tilted the probabilities of what would take place at those courts, insults the intelligence of the community.



ICANN GNSO Council Was Misled Regarding Alleged Capture Of The Original IGO Working Group

Next week, the newly-created IGO Working Group’s Final Report is due to be voted upon by the ICANN GNSO Council, according to agenda item #5. As previously discussed, that working group’s report is an utter sham, and doesn’t reflect the public comments that were opposed to the recommendations.

It’s important to note that this isn’t the first working group that reviewed this issue. The prior working group (that I was a member of; the new working group would not permit me or others with similar views to join) came to very different conclusions. That report was attacked by Phil Corwin of Verisign, in a minority statement that falsely alleged “capture”. How do we know that this was a false claim? We need only look at Phil Corwin’s own statements in November 2017 (prior to the consensus call, when the results were not yet known as to the final recommendations), where he stated:

So far as the values of openness, transparency and inclusion, this working group has been completely open and inclusive. We have – we did extensive outreach to encourage participation by GAC members and IGO representatives. They chose not to become members. That’s not on us; that’s on them. Everything we’ve done is transparent. There’s transcripts, there’s documents.

So far as representativeness, if there is any attempt to besmirch the work of this working group when we issue our final report with allegations that have been captured by any particular group or did not represent enough the different components of the ICANN community, we’ve already – the cochairs have already reviewed that with staff. And while this is a small working group, there’s no requirement that every working group have dozens and dozens or even hundreds of members, but we have had sufficient participation from different parts of the ICANN community, I think, to refute any such allegations if they should arise. [pp.14-15 of transcript]

So, prior to the final results of the working group’s efforts being known, Phil Corwin was happy to defend the output of the working group. In fact, Phil Corwin expected that his preferred option (which involved arbitration) was a shoe-in to be adopted.

He even openly invited me to go on the record with my claims that he (as a co-chair) had abused his authority (in attempting to use an anonymous poll, in violation of ICANN’s transparency requirements), see:

Number one, and, you know, I don’t want to make a big deal out of this but George has stated several times in writing and now just orally that he believes the cochairs have abused their authority. I reject that categorically. The cochairs have been very careful to not cross any bright line in abusing their authority to be administrative and not push toward a particular sharing information about internal ICANN developments is not the same as pushing a particular policy goal. We had a full discussion and the vote could have gone the other way and then we – that wasn’t the will of the working group.

But if anyone who is a member of this working group feels that the chairs have abused their authority, please go ahead and – that they’ve been treated unfairly, go ahead and file a complaint with the ombudsman and have it investigated. But I reject any suggestion of that. [pp.11-12 of transcript]

Why should he be upset, then, when I did successfully file a Section 3.7 appeal, one that was entirely meritorious, as documented on the mailing list archives (see Dec 2017 and beyond)? After that successful appeal resulted in transparent processes to determine consensus, it turns out that Phil Corwin’s preferred outcome of arbitration was completely rejected, with consensus against, as noted in the final report (pp. 19-20, with Option #3 [arbitration] showing “Consensus Call Outcome: MINORITY VIEW (WITH CONSENSUS AGAINST THIS OPTION“).

So, there you have it. When the results of the working group didn’t go his way, like a hypocrite Phil Corwin changed his tune completely and attacked the working group at GNSO Council (a working group that he had great control over, given his role as co-chair). Phil Corwin ignored the fact that he himself openly claimed that working group was representative and shouldn’t be “besmirched” before the results of its processes were determined. He only claimed those processes were “captured” after they resulted in recommendations that differed from his preferred outcome.

GNSO Council was completely misled. On that basis alone, the foundation for creating the new working group was built on a lie.

Why is this important? This led to the creation of a new working group that doesn’t reflect the views of impacted parties (particularly registrants). Indeed, this new working group has ignored fundamental criticisms that were made in the public comments. For example, the Registrar Stakeholder Group’s comment noted that it “has serious concerns about a number of the recommendations in the Interim Report that are contrary to the EPDP’s charter, the position of the ICANN Board, and could prejudice the rights of domain name registrants.” (page 1)

My own detailed submission explained how this new working group’s recommendations are untenable, and the entire history of the issue (including the comments from 2019, which documented the first working group and how its efforts were sabotaged when its recommendations went before the ICANN Board). I encourage anyone who is open-minded to review those thorough submissions, and contrast them with the haphazard recommendations produced by this new sham working group.

In conclusion, the new working group’s final report must be rejected, if ICANN and the GNSO Council value integrity of their processes. In the event they accept this report, they will further delegitimize themselves, and openly declare that their processes are open to manipulation by insiders who wish to promulgate extremist policy views that have been rejected for two decades. “Backchannel sabotage” (see page 45) should not be rewarded.


Our Comments To ICANN Regarding The UDRP Policy Status Report

ICANN staff published a  Policy Status Report regarding the UDRP in early March 2022, which is open for public comments until this coming Tuesday (deadline is April 19, 2022 at 23:59 UTC, less than 24 hours from now).

As noted in Sunday’s blog post, ICANN staff lied to the public. The report should be rejected in its entirety. It is irrevocably flawed and should be withdrawn. ICANN staff have squandered the time and resources that were allocated for this project. It should be redone in its entirety with all the missing elements mentioned in our submission taken into account, perhaps divided amongst multiple independent research groups outside of ICANN. ICANN staff simply don’t have the research skills to do the job, given what we’ve seen to date.

For the benefit of those who have yet to submit their own comments, we have completed our own detailed comments (14 pages) a little bit early, which are also now visible on ICANN’s website. With pro-complainant voices like INTA having already made their submissions, it is important that the voices of domain name registrants be heard, to provide balance.


ICANN Staff Lie To Public In UDRP Policy Status Report

ICANN staff published a Policy Status Report regarding the UDRP in early March 2022, which is open for public comments until this coming Tuesday (deadline is April 19, 2022 at 23:59 UTC). Unfortunately, the staff who prepared it lie to the public, making it another worthless document for those who seek to improve the deeply-flawed domain name dispute resolution procedure. It’s clear that the fix is in, and ICANN staff are merely going through the motions in order to arrive at a predetermined outcome, one that will not address the numerous problems of the UDRP experienced by registrants. Continue reading “ICANN Staff Lie To Public In UDRP Policy Status Report” domain name acquired for $873,000 in 2019 by Grove Collaborative

In December 2021, Grove Collaborative announced their intention to go public via a SPAC. While Grove operates from the domain name, they also own the elite one-word dot-com (which simply redirects to their .co). Are we able to determine the acquisition cost of that  domain name?

As an aside, this domain name movement had been noticed in 2020 by Jamie Zoch, as noted on Twitter:

A recent SEC filing disclosed (on page F-26) the “purchase of intangible assets” in the amount of USD $873,000 in 2019. This was atypical, as there were no similar purchases in 2020 or 2021.

Using the WHOIS history at, we can confirm that the domain name used to be owned by “The Grove Consultants” in 2019. But, the domain name then went into WHOIS privacy. Using, we can see that the Grove Consultants changed their domain name to “” in late 2019. By the start of 2020, the domain name’s redirection changed, so that it redirected to Grove Collaborative’s website instead.

Thus, I believe it’s safe to conclude that Grove Collaborative acquired the domain name for USD $873,000 in 2019, albeit with a transition agreement so that the prior owners could redirect the domain name for a period of time. By 2020, the transition agreement had concluded. and related domain names acquired for $3,006,000 by Waitr

In December 2021, Waitr Holdings disclosed that they were rebranding, and had acquired the domain name. This was noted on Twitter by Elliot Silver (and others):

This week, Waitr’s annual report disclosed that the acquisition cost of those domain names was USD $3,006,000. This appeared on pages 53, F-6 and F-22 of the SEC filing.

Normally, DNJournal doesn’t chart transactions where the purchase price is for multiple domain names (unless the value assigned to each domain name is known). However, given that the primary domain name that was acquired was, with the other related domain names not even mentioned in the SEC filings, I think it’s safe to conclude that the other domain names held negligible value.

Red Alert: Get your domain names out of the UK and Australia now!

If you are a domain name owner using a UK-based or Australian-based registrar, you should seriously consider moving your domains elsewhere, as you apparently have no legal rights to judicial review in their courts after an adverse UDRP or other domain dispute procedure. In other words, you are a second-class citizen if you’re exposed to registrars in those jurisdictions, compared to other jurisdictions in the world. I would strongly recommend that you move your domain names out, or at least get your own independent legal advice.

Continue reading “Red Alert: Get your domain names out of the UK and Australia now!”

Sham ICANN Working Group Plans To Trample on Domain Name Registrants’ Legal Rights

As I warned in October 2021, an ICANN working group intends to seriously jeopardize domain name owners’ legal rights. There was a call for public comments, and my own company submitted a substantial 54 page submission, as did others.

However, the working group just posted to their mailing list a draft of their final report yesterday (see the DOCX attachment at the bottom), one that is essentially unchanged from their highly criticized initial report’s 5 recommendations. IGOs are given new rights not present in law, and instead the rights of domain name registrants to due process are ignored.

Continue reading “Sham ICANN Working Group Plans To Trample on Domain Name Registrants’ Legal Rights”

Galaxy Digital acquired the domain name for $1.8 million

[UPDATED AGAIN ON JANUARY 31, 2022:  After further information from the buyer’s broker, it turns out that USD $1.8 million was indeed the amount received by the seller of the domain name. Any additional fees that changed hands between the buyer and the buyer’s broker are more properly characterized as “success fees.”]

[UPDATED ON JANUARY 30, 2022: Based on additional information from the buyer’s broker, it’s now unclear whether the transaction price for the domain name was USD $1.8 million, so we’ve adjusted the headline and text below accordingly.]

A new SEC filing by Galaxy Digital has disclosed that they purchased a domain for USD $1.8 million last year. See page F-25 of the filing, which states:

During the third quarter of 2021, the Company purchased a website domain name for $1.8 million.

While the SEC filing didn’t reveal the actual domain name, was the likely candidate for the domain name upgrade, given that their current primary domain name is The domain name is under WHOIS privacy, which doesn’t assist us in proving the ownership of that domain. And there is no active website at present for However, there are other clues which point to Galaxy Digital as the new owner of the domain name.

Continue reading “Galaxy Digital acquired the domain name for $1.8 million” domain name acquired for $2.2 million by Forge Global

Forge Global, a private securities marketplace, revealed in a recent SEC filing that it had acquired the domain name in the third quarter of 2021 for USD $2,202,000. This was documented on pages F-96 and F-97 of the filing.

Forge Global announced in September its intention to go public in a $2 billion SPAC deal.